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NOTES
DISPENSING WITH PARENTAL CONSENT IN INDIANA
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
During the January-June period of 1964, 14,733 children were
under the care or supervision of the Indiana Department of Public Wel-
fare.' Some of these children had been placed temporarily for any number
of reasons: because of an emergency such as sickness or death in the
family, because of desertion by one of the parents, or because the parent
was finding some means of support.' Others had been placed permanently
because their parents simply were unwilling or unable to care for them.'
However, it is lamentable how many temporary placements become perma-
nent. In many instances, after placing a child in an agency the parent
visits him for a while, gradually loses interest, and eventually abandons
him completely.' For many of the child's most formative years he is cared
for by an agency or in a succession of foster homes, never knows his
natural parents, and lacks the essentials which make for a wholesome
family life.' Even though there are eligible couples eager to adopt them,
a substantial number of these children who are otherwise available for
adoption are deprived of a chance of finding a new home solely because
their natural parents, although long since having defaulted in all parental
responsibilities, are unwilling to consent to an adoption.6 Because of
this, each of these children must carry with him the adult-size burden of
knowing that his parents are alive and know where he is but do not want
1. DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STATE OF INDIANA, CHILD WELFARE SERVICEs TABLE
2 (1964). Of those 14,733 children, 1,949 were placed in institutions, 4,112 were placed
in boarding homes, 354 were placed in free homes, 1,829 were placed in adoptive homes
(adoptions that had not yet been consummated because of the six to twelve months trial
period), and 15 in work or wage homes. Also, 4,823 children were placed in their own
homes, 4,520 on a free basis and 303 on a pay basis. The number of children placed
with relatives is also sizeable; 1,022 were placed on a free basis and 426 on a pay basis.
It is important to note that some of these children would be non-adoptable regardless of
parental consent because of infirmities.
2. Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 717-18 (1950) ; Interview with Director, Children's
Bureau, Department of Public Welfare of the State of Indiana, in Indianapolis, Octo-
ber 1964.
3. Interview with Director, Children's Bureau, Department of Public Welfare of
the State of Indiana, in Indianapolis, October 1964.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. Cases are not uncommon where children have been under foster care for
ten to fifteen years.
6. Ibid. It is important to point out that many of these children otherwise avail-
able for adoption would not be adopted even after being freed for adoption because they
are members of minority groups in which the rate of adoption is significantly low.
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him. Because their parents cannot care for them or do not want them,
these unadoptable children are for practical purposes orphans just as
surely as are those children whose parents are dead. A negligible number
of these children have perhaps been lucky in that their parents have given
them up so they can be adopted. The others are not so fortunate, for while
their parents have shrugged off all responsibility for the child, they still
fail to make the final move to free their children so that a real and
permanent home can be found for them.
The Welfare and Health Council of New York City made a study
of 4,021 children in fourteen foster-care agencies, tventy-eight percent
of the total number of children in the care of all the voluntary child-care
agencies in New York City.' It was estimated that adoption would be
a sound plan for 773 of the children, almost twenty percent.8 Of these
773 children, 632-eighty percent-were considered legally unavailable
for adoption, and the primary reason for unavailability was the difficulty
of obtaining parental consent.' Similar statistics are not available for
Indiana, but there is no reason to believe that the conclusions reached
would be different in Indiana.
The basic rule in cases of adoption without the consent of the parents
is that the rights of the parent must prevail unless he is clearly shown to
have foregone all parental responsibilities toward the care and welfare
of his child."0 The person seeking to adopt the child has the burden of
proving that the living parents of the child have violated their natural
and legal obligations to the child in such a manner that they come within
the terms of the Indiana statute authorizing waiver of consent of the
natural parents." If what the parents have done or have failed to do is
not named in the statute as grounds for dispensing with consent, then the
child simply cannot be adopted without the parents' consent.
Consequently, there is a need for a workable means to remove the
necessity, under suitable circumstances, for obtaining parental consent as
a prerequisite to adoption. Finding such means is not an easy task, how-
ever, for proceedings terminating parental rights involve several interests
which must be recognized and balanced if a fair result is to be reached.
7. WELFARE AND HEALTH COUNCIL OF NEW YORK CITY, CHILDREN DEPRIVED OF
ADOPTION 4 (1955).
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 10-11.
10. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
11. In re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 189 N.E.2d 573 (1963). Con-
sequently there is a legal presumption that the parent is fit and that his home is a good
one, and the burden of proof is upon the contender to show that the parent is unfit.
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I. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHTS INVOLVED
When the "rights" in a child are at issue the interests of three parties
necessarily are involved-the parent, the child, and the state-and each
interest must be properly balanced against the others to effectuate the
most desirable result. As a general rule the parents have the right to the
control and custody of their children,12 a right which has been recognized
as a constitutionally protected right by the Supreme Court of the United
States.1" The liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution includes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right to marry, to establish a home, to bring up children, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.14 The right, however, of
parents in their child is not an absolute, paramount proprietary right but
is in the nature of a trust imposed on them by the state and carries the
reciprocal obligation to maintain, care for, and protect the child. The
law secures the parents in their right only so long as they shall discharge
these correlative obligations.' If the parents have failed to discharge
their obligations toward their child, the courts may temporarily or perma-
nently, wholly or partially, terminate the parents' rights in him under
the long standing equitable power of parens patriae." The state's obliga-
tion to protect children in need of care consequently is derivative from the
child's right to such protection and may be exercised when the parents
12. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Duckworth, 203 Ind. 276, 281, 198 N.E. 773, 774 (1932)
(" 'Of the many ties that bind humanity, that which unites the parent and child is the
earliest and most hallowed . . . and in all civilized countries it is regarded as sacred.'
. . . Therefore, 'parents have the natural right to the custody of their children,' and
'where one parent is dead the surviving parent, if fit, has the right to the custody."') ;
Dailey v. Dailey, 128 Ind. App. 588, 596, 149 N.E.2d 304, 308 (1958) ("Under the deci-
sions and opinions of the courts of Indiana, ordinarily a parent who is of good character
and reasonably able to provide for his child is entitled to its custody as against others.").
13. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1924) ("The child is not the
mere creature of State. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for adult obligations");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Atkinson v. Usrey, 224 Ind. 155, 65
N.E.2d 489 (1946) (holding that any procedure which fails to extend fundamental and
established rights of the parent fails of due process).
14. Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 225 Ind. 367, 372, 75 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1947)
("The rights of parents, however, are not absolute. They must yield to the welfare of
the child.") ; Luellen v. Younger, 194 Ind. 411, 417, 143 N.E. 163, 164 (1924) ("...
the common law right to the custody and control of minor children is no longer unlimited
or inalienable, and continues only so long as such custody and control are properly
exercised.").
16. Egoff v. Board of Children's Guardians of Madison County, 170 Ind. 238, 84
N.E. 151 (1908) ; Wilkinson v. Board of Children's Guardians, 158 Ind. 1, 62 N.E. 481
(1902) ; State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901) ; Van Walters v. Children's
Guardians, 132 Ind. 567, 32 N.E. 568 (1892) ; Watson v. Department of Pub. Welfare
of Harrison County, 130 Ind. App. 659, 165 N.E.2d 776 (1960).
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have not fulfilled their obligations. Therefore, since they are not absolute,
the constitutionally protected rights of a parent in his child are subject
to the power of the state and may be restricted and regulated by appro-
priate legislative or judicial action.'
In balancing the interests the judiciary enjoy a great amount of
discretion, and many of their rulings have been arbitrarily based on
presumptions and burdens of proof. In the past these presumptions and
burdens of proof have been framed in favor of the natural parent in
the adjudication of adoption cases. However, there has been a modern
revolution in thinking about the rights of children. From court decisions
and writing on adoption has emerged a new level of concern over the
rights of the parties involved. This concern has culminated in the belief
among some courts and writers that the child himself has a right to some
minimum level of care and opportunity apart from the interest of the
state in his future and in contrast to an earlier near total concern with the
rights of the parent in him." "Courts no longer make the natural right of
parents with respect to children the chief basis of their decisions. The
individual interest of parents which used to be the one thing regarded has
come to be almost the last thing regarded as compared with the interest
of the child and the interest of society.""
In Indiana, however it seems that this attitude has not yet found
full expression. In fact, at present, the balance of interests in Indiana, as
reflected in the statutes and the cases interpreting them, seems inequitable.
The weight of justice often appears to favor the natural parents in
opposition to the rights and best interests of the child.
II. THE PRESENT LAW
A. The Indiana Dependency and Neglect Proceedings
Parental rights may be temporarily and perhaps permanently, wholly,
or partially terminated in dependency and neglect proceedings under the
Indiana Juvenile Court Act.2" It is in these proceedings that the interests
17. State v. Bailey, supra note 16, at 329, 61 N.E. at 731: "The natural rights of
a parent to the custody and control of a child are subordinate to the power of the state
and may be restricted and regulated by municipal laws."
18. "We have in this country some vague idea of a level of care and opportunity
for children that should be the minimum, and this is translated into the law with varving
degrees of definiteness." Baker, Uphold Rights of Parent and Child, The Child, Aug.
1948. p. 29; Simpson, The Unfit Parent, 39 U. DEr. L.J. 347 (1962).
19. POUND, SPIRIT OF THE CoanisoN LAW, 189 (1921). However, it is important
to note this merely is descriptive of the current trend in the law today and not at all
descriptive of the situation in Indiana.
20. IN . ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3201 to -3225 (Burns 1956).
As parens patriae the state has assumed the power to take abandoned and neglected
children from their parents for the welfare of all infants. Johnson v. White Circuit
Court, 255 Ind. 602, 77 N.E.2d 298 (1947). Under the ancient common law, the king, as
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of the child receive greatest recognition. It is well-established as a general
rule that the welfare and best interests of the child are the controlling
elements in the determination of all disputes as to dependency and neglect,
and the court will make such order for the child's disposition as will better
his welfare without reference to the wishes of the parties or parental
rights.2 While the legal rights of the parents are entitled to consideration
in dependency and neglect proceedings, such rights are' secondary and
subordinate to the child's present and future welfare. 2 However, it is
important to note that in such proceedings the parents' legal rights should
not be lost sight of as an influential factor; and the parents should not
forfeit these rights unless their conduct or circumstances generally render
it essential to the safety and welfare of the child in some important
respect, physically, intellectually, or morally.2"
In the Juvenile Court Act the legislature has defined who dependent
or neglected children are, 4 and the courts are directed to assume responsi-
parenw patriae, was deemed to have charge of all persons who, because of youth and
inexperience, were unable to care for themselves and protect their estates. Eyre v.
Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722); Lou, JUVENiLE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1927). Indiana has continued and extended this jurisdiction under
its juvenile court acts. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3201 to -3225 (Bums 1956). There also
is a section on dependent children, IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-505 (Burns 1964), which affects
the operation of the Juvenile Court Act and which gives the county board of welfare
or a reputable citizen the right to file a writ to have a child adjudged dependent or
neglected and have the child committed to the custody of the board of children's guard-
ians. See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-813 (Burns 1956), which has provisions making
the abuse, abondonment, cruelty to, or neglect of a child a criminal offense.
21. See e.g., Board of Children's Guardian's v. Gioscio, 210 Ind. 581, 4 N.E.2d 199
(1936) ; State v. Bailey, 187 Ind. 234, 61 N.E. 730 (1901) ; Watson v. Department of
Pub. Welfare of Harrison County, 130 Ind. App. 659, 165 N.E.2d 770 (1960); Dunes
v. Deckard, 105 Ind. App. 674, 17 N.E.2d 481 (1938) ; Orr v. State, 70 Ind. App. 292,
123 N.E. 470 (1919) ; Nunn v. State, 55 Ind. App. 37, 103 N.E. 439 (1913).
22. Duckworth v. Duckworth, 203 Ind. 276, 283, 179 N.E. 773, 775 (1932) : "The
welfare of the child will outweigh the legal rights of the parents when the parents are
unsuitable, unfit, or incompetent to take care of the child, [citations omitted] and may
outweigh the legal rights of the parents even though they may be suitable persons to
have such custody, where the real and permanent interests of the child demand a differ-
ent disposition."
23. Duckworth v. Duckworth, 203 Ind. 276, 179 N.E. 773 (1932).
24. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3205 (Bums 1956): "The words 'dependent child' as
used herein, or in any other statute concerning the care, custody or control of children,
shall mean any boy under the age of eighteen [18] years or any girl under the age of
eighteen [18] years, who is dependent upon the public for support, or who is destitute,
homeless or abandoned;" and IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3206 (Burns 1956) :
The words 'neglected child' as used herein, or in any other statute concerning
the care, custody or control of children shall mean any boy under the age of
eighteen [18] years or any girl under the age of eighteen [18] years who:
1) Has not proper parental care of guardianship;
2) Is destitute, homeless or abandoned;
3) Habitually begs or receives alms;
4) By reason of neglect, cruelty or disrepute on the part of the
parents, guardians or other persons in whose care the child may be
is living in an improper place;
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bility for dependent children (that is, those who have been abandoned and
are without adequate means of support) through public welfare agencies
and foster homes.2" Similarly, when the parents fail to perform legally
recognized duties owed by them to their children, the court will declare
the infant to be a neglected child and remove him from the harmful
environment created by them.26 The cases decided under the Juvenile
Court Act suggest that dependency and neglect are not necessarily based
on the conduct of the parent but on the circumstances of the child. Con-
sequently, a child may be dependent or neglected when the care that his
parents provide or secure for him is so inadequate or detrimental that he
would be better off in an institution or foster home or under the super-
vision of a public agency; but even though a child is deserted by his
parents he is not dependent or neglected within the meaning of the statute
if someone is giving him parental-type care.27 In dependency and neglect
proceedings the parents' rights are usually only temporarily terminated ;2"
and provision usually is made to enable the parents to regain their rights
on a showing of changed conditions. Under the Juvenile Court Act the
first hearing may result in either a "temporary" or "permanent" termina-
tion of the parents' rights, but either result may be the same since the
parent may re-open the case to regain the child after either a "temporary"
5) Is in an environment dangerous to life, limb or injurious to the
health or morals of himself or others.
However, such a child receiving care from an authorized agency need not
necessarily come to the attention of the court.
See also Orr v. State, 70 Ind. App. 242, 251, 123 N.E. 470, 473 (1919) : "It is not the
province of the courts to determine generally what conditions or exigencies will warrant
the state in seizing the children of its citizens and making them wards of the state, such
being a legislative function, which cannot be delegated to the courts."
25. Bradburn v. Bradburn, 209 Ind. 61, 197 N.E. 905 (1935) ; Bullock v. Robertson,
160 Ind. 521, 522, 65 N.E. 5 (1902) ("It is reasonable and just that the courts should have
this power for the benefit of infants. Their custody should not depend upon the acci-
dent of possession. The real question is to whom should they be entrusted for their own
good and that of society."); IND. ANN STAT. § 9-3207 (Burns 1956).
26. Board of Children's Guardians v. Gioscio, 210 Ind. 581, 4 N.E.2d 199 (1936).
27. It has been held that a child who was a ward of the juvenile court and was
receiving county aid was a "dependent child." Dumas v. Deckard, 105 Ind. App. 674, 17
N.E.2d 481 (1938). The courts also have held that a child lacked parental care and
guardianship and was neglected where she had been left in a home with friends, was
visited by the father while intoxicated, and had at various times been left where liquor
was consumed, Watson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 130 Ind. App. 659, 165 N.E.2d
770 (1960) ; and a child has been held to be neglected within the meaning of the statute
where it appeared that the child's mother practically made her house a brothel, Nunn v.
State, 55 Ind. App. 37, 103 N.E. 439 (1913). However, a child who was abandoned by
his parents and who was taken by grandparents into their home and treated with great
affection as a member of the family was held not to be a "dependent" or "neglected"
child within the meaning of the statutory definitions. Orr v. State, 70 Ind. App. 242,
123 N.E. 470 (1919).
28. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Burns 1956) provides for the placing of a child
who has been found dependent or neglected in an institution, foster home, or other
agency approved home.
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or "permanent" termination. 9 Even so, the courts are very reluctant
to terminate permanently in dependency or neglect proceedings, and in the
rare cases where permanent termination is decreed, the court may state
that although a decree of permanent termination has been entered, the
parents may still be able to regain their rights."0
It is debatable, however, whether an irrevocable "permanent" termi-
nation is within the intended scope of the Juvenile Court Act. It appears
that juvenile court legislation is intended to afford a means by which
a child may receive the guidance and control that should have been pro-
vided by his parents. 1 Thus many feel that the primary purposes of the
Juvenile Court Act are met by temporary care, looking toward an
improvement in parental circumstances and that an irrevocable "per-
manent" termination of parental rights is not within the spirit or letter
of the act. It is clear that the act itself does not speak of "permanent"
termination."
29. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3201 to -3225 (Burns 1956).
30. Hogg v. Peterson, 245 Ind. -, 198 N.E.2d 767 (1964). Judges seem reluctant
to deprive permanently except in unusual circumstances, for they feel the parent may be
able to produce the right type of home for a child, an event which would warrant his
return to the home.
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3201 (Burns 1956)
The purpose of this act is to secure for each child within its provisions such
care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve the child's
welfare and best interests of the state; and when such child is removed from
his own family, to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as
possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents.
The principle is hereby recognized that children under the jurisdiction of the
court are subject to the discipline and entitled to the protection of the state,
which may intervene to safeguard them from neglect or injury and to enforce
the legal obligations due to them and from them.
It appears that part of the basis of the early juvenile court law was the Elizabethan
Poor Law, under 43 Elizabeth, ch. 2. The statute made minimum provisions for the
care of children, it prescribed no standards, and it explicitly placed the decision of
apprenticing children out within the administrator's unconfined discretion. The statute
is silent about parental rights, and in fact not until the early 1900's did the courts start
talking about parental rights. It appears that the special legal provisions were designed
not to solve the causes and problems of destitution but to minimize the cost to the public
of maintaining the destitute. For an excellent discussion of the early Elizabethan Poor
Law and also of the Field Draft Codes of New York, which were the first statutes in
America codifying the common law in this area, see Ten Brock, California's Dual System
of Fanily Law, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 257 (1964).
32. The sections in controversy are IND ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3201 to -3225 (Burns
1956). However, it is interesting to note that § 9-2808, applying to the disposition of
juvenile dependents and delinquents, makes provision that "all children declared public
wards under the provision of this act shall remain public wards until they reach the age
of twenty-one (21) years, unless they shall upon a proper showing made be returned to
their parents or other legal guardian, or adopted in the mianner prescribed by law."
(Emphasis added.) However, this still does not tell us whether this section falls under
the non-consensual provisions of the Adoption Act. It merely tells us that if the child
is adopted, he may no longer remain a public ward. Consequently, we are still faced
with the problem of whether or not the Juvenile Court Act operates to terminate par-
ental rights permanently.
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Nevertheless, the supreme court in a recent decision held that the
Juvenile Court Act may, when coupled with the Adoption Act, operate
to sever permanently the rights of parents in their child. In Hogg v.
Peterson, two children, after notice had been given to their parents, were
made "permanent wards of the Stark County department of public wel-
fare" under the Juvenile Court Act following the sentencing of the
parents to prison.33 It was held that notice to and consent of the parents
to the subsequent adoption of the children was unnecessary under the
provision of the adoption statute which provides that notice and consent
are necessary if the parents have been "legally deprived of their parental
rights over such child for reasons other than economic."34 It appears
unquestionably that this is authority for the proposition that the Juvenile
Court Act can operate in conjunction with the adoption statute to termi-
nate parental rights permanently.
The early case of Egoff v. Madison County Board of Children's
Guardians clarifies the issue.3" In that case it appeared that in proceedings
under the Board of Children's Guardians Act,8" to which the parents were
parties, custody of the child had been given to the Board of Children's
Guardians "until the further order of the court."3 " The court held that
the parents were not entitled to notice of subsequent adoption proceedings
brought by third persons, since they already had been fully divested of
the custody and control of the child. In effect the court held that the
parents' rights had been permanently terminated under the wardship
proceedings.
The Board of Children's Guardians Act has since been amended and
the powers and duties of such boards have been transferred to the county
departments of public welfare.3" In 1959 the legislature amended the
Juvenile Court Act39 to authorize Departments of Public Welfare to file
petitions for wardship in cases of dependent or neglected children. How-
ever, even though the county departments of public welfare have assumed
the duties and powers of the boards of children's guardians, they can still
33. 245 Ind. - , 198 N.E2d 767, 768 (1964).
34. IiN. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946).
35. 170 Ind. 238, 84 N.E. 151 (1908).
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-505 (Burns 1964). It appears that this statute also has
its roots in the Elizabethan Poor Law. Many other states followed the early law and
had enactments much the same as the Board of Children's Guardians Act in Indiana.
See, e.g., CAL. STAT. 1858, ch. CLXXII, § 6, whereby town officers were given authority
in the case of any child, "who, or whose parents are, or shall become, chargeable to any
such town or city." Ten Broek, supra note 31, at 963.
37. Egoff v. Madison County Board of Children's Guardians, 170 Ind. 238, 241, 84
N.E. 151, 152 (1908).
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1121 (Burns 1964).
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Burns 1956).
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act under the statute applicable to the board of children's guardians,"0 and
as enunciated in Egoff, this statute may also operate in conjunction with
the adoption act to permanently terminate parental rights.
Consequently, the weight of authority appears to support the proposi-
tion that the juvenile court proceeding can be used, in some cases, to
terminate permanently the rights of parents in their child. However, it
seems that when proper cognizance is taken of the purposes and
functions of the Juvenile Court Act, the Hogg and Egoff results should
not be accepted unquestionably but rather with hesitation. 4L
It seems probable that in a great majority of dependency and neglect
proceedings the parents and the court consider a termination of parental
rights to be only temporary and even in cases where the termination is
denominated "permanent" it is not considered to be irrevocably permanent
by either court or parent. As in Hogg and Ego ff, however, either a
temporary or permanent termination42 can, without notice to the parents,
become irrevocable by the subsequent adoption of the child. Thus a pro-
ceeding brought to temporarily terminate parental rights for a relatively
minor parental act or omission can result in an irrevocable permanent
termination and thus result in a gross injustice to parental rights. Further-
more, such proceedings do not practically operate to free children for
adoption because the final irrevocable termination of parental rights is
not accomplished43 until the adoption itself has been granted.
B. The Indianca Adoption Statute
Since dependency proceedings are apparently inadequate to deal with
the problem of lack of consent, whatever solution is available in the
present law must lie in the adoption statute.44 However, in Indiana the
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-505, 52-1121 (Burns 1964).
41. For an excellent discussion of juvenile court legislation in Indiana see Note,
29 IND. L.J. 475 (1954). It appears that the purposes of the early Elizabethan statutes
from which modem juvenile court statutes evolved were to take care of specific needs;
and in the later statutes adopted in Indiana (the Juvenile Court Act and the Board of
Children's Guardians Act) these needs were expanded. Consequently, as applied to the
Juvenile Court Act's operation, the court has either misinterpreted history in the Hogg
decision or has done what the statute required it to do. The question is whether or not
this is socially desirable.
42. The termination in Egoff was temporary ("until the further order of the
court"), 170 Ind. at 241, 84 N.E. at 153, and in Hogg the termination was permanent
("to be made a permanent ward of the court") 245 Ind. at - , 198 N.E.2d at 768.
43. The parents can have their rights restored at any time by a showing of suf-
ficently changed conditions. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
44. While adoption is a practice of antiquity with its main roots in the Roman law,
the right of adoption was unknown to the common law. See, e.g., Humphries v. Davis,
100 Ind. 274 (1884). See also Brosman, The Law of Adoption, 22 CoLumX L. REv. 332,
335 (1922), for an excellent discussion of the roots of the adoption proceeding. The
object of the. ancient adoption laws was not necessarily to protect children unwanted by
their parents. The Roman law used adoption to bolster the position of the family by
NOTES
weight of authority seems to be that the adoption statute should be strictly
construed in favor of the rights of the natural parent."5 The only notable
exception to this general rule is found in Emmons v. Dinelli.46 In Emmons
the parent rested her case on the argument that since adoption is statutory
and the statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly
construed in favor of the rights of the natural parent. The parent-
appellant contended that the rule of strict construction is uniformly applied
by courts in support of parental rights and that this is especially true in
cases in which it is claimed that a parent's misconduct has made his
consent unnecessary."' The parent, in effect, was pointing to the ap-
parently basic principle in adoption proceedings that there is a legal
presumption that the natural parent is fit and his home is a good one
and that the burden of proof is on the contender to show that the parent
is unfit." However, the supreme court in Emmons rejected these
principles in part and stated that "the object and purpose of our statute
relating to this matter is manifestly to give to unfortunate children whb
have been bereft of love and parental care the benefits of a home, and of
such parental care, and the law should receive a liberal construction to
effect this purpose."4  At the same time the supreme court in Emmons
held that the statute, being in derogation of the common law, should be
strictly construed in its procedural requirements, implying that it should
receive a liberal construction as to the welfare of the child and affirming
the rules laid down in earlier cases.
However, in the more recent case of In re Adoption of Bryant, the
appellate court stated that no court could seriously disagree with any of
the rules laid down in Enmons but went on to state that "since the
relationship between parent and child is a bundle of human rights of such
fundamental importance, it has generally been held that adoption statutes
being in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed in
adding strength to it. Huard, Law of Adoption: Ancient and Moderns, 9 VAND. L. REv.
743-45 (1956). The first Indiana adoption statute was enacted in 1855, Ind. Acts 1855,
ch. 56, §§ 1-6, at 122, and with amendments throughout the years culminated in the
present Indiana Adoption Act passed in 1941, Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 146 at 438, and amended
in 1943, Ind. Acts 1943, ch. 40, § 5, at 89.
45. See, e.g., It re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 189 N.E.2d 593 (1963);
It re Adoption of Chaney, 128 Ind. App. 603, 150 N.E.2d 754 (1958).
46. 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
47. 235 Ind. 249, 258, 133 N.E.2d 56, 60 (1956).
48. Child v. Dodd, 51 Ind. 484 (1885) ; In re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App.
480, 189 N.E.2d 593 (1963).
49. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 261, 133 N.E.2d 56, 61 (1956). In two cases
decided the year prior to Emmons, the supreme court held that the dominant and ultimate
consideration in an adoption case is the best interests of the child. Rhodes v. Shirley,
234 Ind. 587, 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Rhodes v. Virgile, 234 Ind. 598, 129 N.E.2d 65
(1955).
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favor of a worthy parent and the preservation of such relationship."50
This is not to say that it is presumed that the natural parent is fit and that
his home is a good one but rather that the natural parent-child relationship
should be preserved if at all possible. The court went on to state, however,
that the rules laid down in Emmon.s "need [to] be tempered by the rule
that neither should the statute be so liberally construed that it would de-
stroy safeguards erected for preservation of family relationships."'" The
fact that In re Adoption of Bryant was decided by an appellate court and
Emmons was decided by the supreme court of Indiana is relevant. In. re
Adoption of Chancy 2 also was decided subsequent to the Emmons de-
cision; and although it also is an appellate court case, it gives support to
the argument that since adoption proceedings in Indiana are purely
statutory and in derogation of the common law, the statutes must be
construed strictly as to all procedural requirements and "strictly followed
in all essential particulars." The court, in stating the rule of strict con-
struction, approved of the Emmons decision and apparently interpreted
Emmons as applying the rule of strict construction. The Chancy decision
was approved by the court in In re Adoption of Bryant.
In light of these subsequent decisions by the appellate courts of the
state, the argument that the rule of strict construction in Emmons goes
only to the procedural aspects and not the substantive law does not have
much weight. The supreme court has not yet had opportunity to pass
on the issue raised by these cases, and doubt remains whether the rule of
strict construction, well-imbedded as to procedural requirements, also
applies with respect to substantive standards, despite the contrary language
in Emmons. It also appears that the courts have gone far in protecting
the rights of a parent, even though in these cases and others like them
it was claimed that, owing to his misconduct, the parent's consent to the
adoption was not required."8
In sum, through the adoption cases seems to run a strong judicial
tendency to help bind the parent and child in their natural relationship; in
contrast, the disposition of a minor in a dependency or neglect case is not
controlled by hard and fast rules of law, and the judge is allowed to
exercise a great deal of discretion with regard to what is best for the
50. 134 Ind. App. 480, 486, 189 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1963).
51. Ibid.
52. 128 Ind. App. 603, 150 N.E.2d 754 (1958).
53. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956); In re Adoption of
Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 189 N.E.2d 593 (1963) ; It re Adoption of Chaney, 128 Ind.
App. 603, 150 N.E.2d 754 (1958); In the Matter of the Adoption of Force, 126 Ind.
App. 156, 131 N.E.2d 157 (1956).
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minor's present and future welfare and happiness. "4 It appears that the
basis for distinguishing between the standards for custody and for
adoption is the finality involved in each. It is only natural that, where
some basic right is to be terminated irrevocably rather than temporarily,
additional safeguards be established to protect the one losing his rights.
Thus, in adoption proceedings, except where the case is clear for one side,
courts are inclined to favor the natural parents on the basis of a belief that
the natural parent-child relationship is inherently better than the adoptive
relationship.5 The validity of this assumption has been questioned as the
result of research, " and consideration of the typical situation in the usual
home from which children being considered for adoption come also casts
doubt upon this assumption. Half the children considered for adoption
are illegitimate, " and frequently the natural parent contesting the adoption
is an unwed mother. It has been suggested that the unwed mother is often
neurotic, psychopathic, or mentally defective and uses the child as a
weapon against her parents and herself. " At best she is subject to social
and emotional pressures not conducive to supplying a stable home life.
Even when the child is not illegitimate, the mere fact that the child was
placed for adoption suggests that perhaps adverse emotional or financial
factors exist in the natural home, whereas the whole adoption process aims
at selectivity in adoptive parents.
Adoption creates an artificial relation of parents and child and severs
the natural parent-child relationship. It is obvious on general legal prin-
ciples that such a change should not be made without the consent of
the natural parents unless they have forfeited their rights by some mis-
conduct, and the statutes of Indiana so provide. "9 In general, there can
be no adoption in the absence of consent given in accordance with statute,
unless the ultimate fact of abandonment or desertion is found to exist."0
54. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Bryant, supra note 53 (natural relationship);
Renard v. Renard, 126 Ind. App. 245, 132 N.E.2d 278 (1956) (discretion in custody
proceedings); Dailey v. Dailey, 128 Ind. App. 588, 149 N.E.2d 304 (1958) (minor's
happiness).
55. judge Robert E. Dempesy, recently retired as senior judge of Westchester
Family Court, New York, summed up the attitude of the courts when he said, "As long
as there is any possibility of having the youngster restored to his parents, it should be
followed to the nth degree." Evansville Sunday Courier and Press, February 7, 1965,
Parade Magazine, p. 4.
56. Note, 61 YALE L.J. 591, 595 n. 21 (1952).
57. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND VELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STATISTICAL
SERVIcE No. 14, 20 (1951).
58. BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZA-
TION: MONOGRAPH SERIES 94 (1952).
59. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946).
60. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956). Specifically the
statute requires the written consent of living parents; the consent of the child if he is
over fourteen years of age; the consent of a parent who is a minor must be accompanied
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Of the state adoption statutes all but South Carolina's contain a provision
for dispensing with the consent of a parent who has failed to fulfill his
obligations in certain ways.6 In Indiana, consent is not required if the
parent has abandoned or deserted his child for six months or more
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, has been
deprived of his parental rights over the child for reasons other than
economic, or is unknown." In addition, the court, in its discretion, need
not require the filing of the consent of the father where he has failed to
pay support money for a period of one year immediately prior to the
filing of any proceedings.6"
In Indiana, the question of whether or not a parent has acted in such
a way as to dispense with his consent does not arise until the adoption
proceeding itself."' Thus in many instances, such as the case of abandon-
ment, there has been no prior judicial determination of whether the
parents are so guilty of misconduct that their consent may be dispensed
with. As a result, the judge in the adoption proceeding is faced with two
distinct questions: Whether the natural parents have so conducted them-
selves that their parental rights should be permanently terminated and
whether the child should be adopted by the petitioners." These questions
present separate problems and involve different policy factors. The mere
fact that the child's welfare would be promoted by the adoption is not
enough to cut off the natural parents' rights; and the unfitness of the
natural parents does not establish the fitness of the petitioners. 6 Yet, if
the two issues are considered in the same proceeding, it is difficult to keep
them separate and to examine them objectively. The legal issues tend to
by the written approval of the local investigating agency and, if none, of the state
department of public welfare; and in every case where the child has been born out of
wedlock the consent of the mother is sufficient, except where the paternity of the 'child
has been established by law and the father is adequately supporting the child or where
for any reason the court deems it advisable that the father be heard. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-120 (Burns 1946).
61. For an exhaustive list of the statutes of the fifty-one jurisdictions see Simpson,
The Unfit Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347, 360 n.89 (1962).
62. This is only after diligent inquiry and publication has been made and if the
fact that the parents are unknown appears by indorsement on the petition and by the
oath or affirmation of two disinterested persons. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946).
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid. After the child has resided with his new parents during a supervisory
period, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-117 (Burns 1946), and new emotional attachments have
been established, the petition for adoption is filed with the issue of consent then being
litigated. The proceedings to adopt a child are purely ex parte, and no adversary except
living parents is contemplated. Johnson v. Smith, 203 Ind. 214, 176 N.E. 705 (1931) ;
Brown v. Brown, 101 Ind. 340 (1884). Whether or not the order of adoption shall be
made upon the petition is a matter the statute places exclusively in the discretion of the
court. Leonard v. Honisfager, 43 Ind. App. 607, 88 N.E. 91 (1909).
65. Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 727 (1950).
66. Note, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 579, 582 (1957).
67. Note, 14 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 303, 307 n.16 (1947).
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become confused, the identity of the adoptive parents is learned by the
natural parents, and the door is left open for interference in the child's
new home and perhaps for blackmail by the natural parents.68 "Con-
sequently, child-care agencies will not place a child in a home for the
purpose of adoption unless the natural parents have surrendered the child
for adoption.""0 They refuse to take the risk of creating new emotional
ties when the child, in all probability, might be taken from its new home
in just a few months."0 Thus, in effect the child is administratively un-
adoptable as long as the parents refuse to consent to the adoption. And
in the great majority of cases where the parents fail to consent voluntarily
and consent cannot be obtained by operation of law, it is the welfare of
the child that suffers while the parent maintains his parental rights or the
privilege of regaining them.
It is clear that under the Indiana Adoption Act the court may, in
its discretion, not require the filing of the consent of the father where he
has failed to pay support money for a year immediately prior to the
filing of any proceedings." By clear statutory language the judge has
been bestowed with a great deal of discretion in his right to dispense with
the consent of the father.72 It appears that even if a father intentionally
refused to pay support for his child, he might retain the privilege of block-
ing the adoption by refusing to consent to it.
The law is not entirely clear as to just what constitutes "failure of
support." In Emmons v. Dinelh 103 the court stated that the mere lack of
support payments is not "failure to support" within the statute dispensing
with consent. Thus it appears that the courts are willing to look at
extenuating circumstances and decide each case on its own particular
facts. "
63. Note, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 759, 773-79 (1954).
69. Interview with Director, Children's Bureau, Department of Public Welfare of
the State of Indiana, in Indianapolis, October 1964.
70. Ibid.
71. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946). It is interesting to note that the
statute only applies to the failure of support by the father and makes no mention of the
failure of support payments of the mother. In the vast majority of cases it is the
mother who retains custody and receives the support payments for the child. Consequent-
ly the omission of the mother's failure of support payments for the child appears not to
have been inadvertent.
72. This discretion held by the judge is interwoven throughout the Adoption Act.
See Leonard v. Honisfager, 43 Ind. App. 607, 88 N.E. 91 (1909).
73. 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
74. In In re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 189 N.E.2d 593 (1963), it was
stated that the father did not fail to support his child within the statute dispensing
with consent of the father to an adoption in the event that the father has failed to
support the child where the father and mother were divorced before the birth of the
child and the mother rejected the father's offer of support.
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If the parents have been deprived of their parental rights for reasons
other than economic, their consent to an adoption may be dispensed with." '
It appears that the Juvenile Court Act may operate in conjunction with
this provision of the adoption statute to allow the child to be adopted
without the consent of the parents. Because of the paucity of cases in this
area, it is difficult to determine how effective this provision really has
been. However, it does appear that the effect of the provision has been
minimal in freeing unwanted children for adoption.
A third situation in which consent of the natural parents is un-
necessary in an adoption proceeding is when the child is adjudged to have
been abandoned. Specifically, the statute provides in part that the consent
of the parent or parents may be dispensed with if the child is adjudged to
have been abandoned or deserted for six months or more immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the petition."8 There seems to be a
practical unanimity in the cases as to the definition of the word "abandon-
ment" when used in the adoption statute: abandonment exists when the
parent's conduct evidences a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child for the time prescribed by
statute.7 And the overwhelming weight of authority in the adjudicated
cases supports a requirement that the relinquishment be complete and
absolute." Therefore, the rules in the adjudicated cases seem uniformly
clear with reference to the essential elements of abandonment under the
adoption statutes. The difficulty has arisen in the application of the legal
definition of abandonment to the facts of the particular case; consequently,
just what facts satisfy the definition is not dear.
In the Emmons case for a period of nearly four years prior to the
filing of the adoption proceedings the child was "bereft of a home and
parental care."7 During this period the natural parent imposed the burden
of providing a home and care for her infant daughter upon the child's
parental aunt, although she could have kept the child with her in the home
of her parents. During all this time she was loath to assume her parental
duty to care for the child, even temporarily. Testimony indicated that
she showed little affection for the child. She did, however, maintain
some interest in the child during this period by visiting her at irregular
intervals and giving her occasional presents and monetary gifts totalling
about 200 dollars. During nearly all of the four year period the mother
75. INiD. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946).
76. Ibid.
77. Enmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956) ; In the Matter of the
Adoption of Force, 126 Ind. App. 156, 131 N.E.2d 157 (1956). For a large collection of
supporting authority, see annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 662, 665 (1954).
78. Ibid.
79. 235 Ind. 249, 265, 133 N.E2d 56, 64, (1956).
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was employed. What then, on these facts, must be the position of the
court on the subject of the "abandonment or desertion" of a child by a
parent who manifestly intends to keep and enjoy the privileges of parent-
hood but refuses to assume its corresponding duties and responsibilities
over an extended and indeterminate period?
Many of the states require the abandonment to be willful,"0 but the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Emmons, seizing upon the fact that "willful"
is omitted from the statute, concluded that "the careless and negligent
failure to perform the duties of parenthood is a significant element in the
offense of abandonment or desertion, which neglect is to be considered
regardless of any actual intention or settled purpose by the parent to
relinquish the proprietary claim of the parent to the child."'" Even so,
the court found that there was a sufficient "willful" withholding of
parental companionship, support, care, and protective sympathy and affec-
tion for the child by the mother to constitute "abandonment," that the
abandonment had existed for the statutory period, and that the best
interests of the child would be served by the adoption.
However, in the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Force,2
a mother took her child from her home in Jasonville to Richmond where
she sought employment. In Richmond the mother left the child with
relatives of its father and during the nine months the child was left with
the relatives the mother visited it from one to three times a week. Then
she sought to retake the child but was forcibly restrained by the relatives.
The court held that the mother had not abandoned the child because it
found no evidence of a "settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child."8"
The Force case is distinguishable from the Emmons case in several
particulars. The most obvious distinction is the time involved in the two
cases. In Emmons the mother had entrusted the care of the child to others
over a four year period. A period of such duration might supply the
evidence of "settled purpose" which the court found lacking in the Force
case. In addition, in Emmons, the mother's visits were much less frequent
than those of the mother in Force. The evidence in Emmons that the
mother could have kept the child with her and that she showed little
80. See, e.g., It re Adoption of Hoose, 243 N.C. 589, 91 S.E.2d 555 (1956) ; In re
Adoption of Gates, 84 Ohio App. 269, 85 N.E.2d 597 (1948) ; In re Wilcox Adoption,
220 Ore. 509, 349 P.2d 862 (1960) ; Whitton v. Scott, 120 Vt. 452, 144 A.2d 706 (1958).
81. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 269, 133 N.E.2d 56, 65 (1956). This case
emphasizes the carrying out of parental duties: "Of what importance is it to a child if
his parents do not 'intend' to rob him of the nurture, love and security of a happy home,
if such a home is not provided?" Ibid.
82. 126 Ind. App. 156, 131 N.E.2d 157 (1956).
83. Id. at 166, 131 N.E.2d at 161.
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affection for it and the apparent lack of such evidence in Force further
distinguish the cases. Both the Emmons court and the Force court used
the same definition of abandonment.8 4 The results in the two cases
indicate the importance of degree in the facts on which abandonment is
based, but they do not suggest any very specific guides to use in determin-
ing whether or not there is abandonment.
It is certain, however, that the mere giving up by the parent of the
possession of his child does not indicate abandonment. In the recent case
of In re Adoption of Bryant,5 the father and mother were divorced four
months after marriage and before the mother realized she was pregnant.
Upon the birth of the child the father acknowledged it, gave it his name,
and agreed with the mother that she should have custody. He visited the
child frequently and supported it after the mother's death. The mother
cared for the child for twelve months before she was killed in an auto
accident. Fourteen days after her death the father was in court resisting
the adoption of the child by the mother's parents. The court held on these
facts that the father had not abandoned the child for purposes of the
provision dispensing with the consent of a parent in the event the parent
has abandoned the child, for the only period of time which the decree
of the local court could have operated (six months immediately preceding
the filing of the adoption petition) was the period during which the mother
of the child was alive and during which the child was not bereft of home
and parental care but, quite the contrary, had both. Therefore, to find
abandonment in a case such as this would require the court to hold as a
matter of law that the mere acquiescence of the father in the mother's
custody of his child would constitute a relinquishment of parental rights.
And this the court clearly could not do, for there was not an evincement
here of a "settled purpose" or "intention" to forego any parental duties
or obligations. To the contrary, the father's contributions to the child's
support indicated an intent to recognize his parental duties and re-
sponsibilities.
Under the present adoption procedure, a child apparently neglected
by its natural parents might reside in a foster home for a considerable
length of time; and later, at the adoption hearing, if it is found the
child has not been abandoned the court is still confronted with the necessity
of deciding the issue of custody between devoted foster parents to whom
the child is strongly attached and a natural parent who has not legally
abandoned his child and whose absence may have been justified." Even if
84. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 266, 133 N.E.2d 56, 60 (1956) ; In the Matter
of the Adoption of Force, 126 Ind. App. 156, 161, 131 N.E.2d 157, 159 (1956).
85. 134 Ind. App. 480, 189, N.E.2d 593 (1963).
86. Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 773 (1954).
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the foster parents receive custody, "legal title" and claims to the child's
filial obligation remain with the natural parents."7 While the adoptive
parents may have assumed all parental responsibilities, the natural parents
may continue to show just enough interest in the child to preclude
adoption.
In addition to the heavy burden of proof resting upon those seeking
to establish abandonment and the persistence of the courts in resolving
all doubt in the natural parents' favor, abandonment seems to be a "con-
tinuing process." Even though their previous conduct showed an intent
to abandon, natural parents may change their minds and might successfully
reclaim their child from a foster home on the eve of adoption.
III. TERMINATION LEGISLATION AND THE STATUTES INVOLVED
A small number of jurisdictions have attempted to deal with the
problems resulting from lack of parental consent by providing statutorily
for a separate procedure to terminate the rights of parents prior to an
adoption proceeding88 This termination proceeding is primarily used to
determine the fitness of the parents; and if the parent is deemed unfit and
likely to continue to be so, parental rights will be irrevocably terminated
and the child freed for adoption. One purpose and effect of such legisla-
tion has been to more evenly balance the interests of the parent and child.
In addition, termination legislation separates the issues of the unfitness
of the natural parents and the fitness of the adoptive parents so that they
may be examined more objectively. When there is a contest the natural
parents' rights are finally terminated in one action and cannot be reopened
in a subsequent proceeding for adoption." Only with judicial termination
87. For a complete analysis of reciprocal rights and duties between parent and
child see 4 VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAmY LAws 3-111 (1936).
88. See, e.g., CALIF. WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE § 701 (1949); CONN. REV.
STAT. §§ 17-43a (Supp. 1959) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103 (1955) ; LA. REv. STAT.
§§ 9:403- :404 (1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9-6-1 (1939); Wis. STAT. § 48A0 (1955);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-53 (1957). See also Note, 23 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 241
(1954-55) ; Simpson, supra note 61, for a comparison of the various termination stat-
utes. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare also has a proposed statute
for the termination of parental rights, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
AND R EspoNsmpIonES, PUB. No. 394 (1963), and the Uniform Adoption Act contains a
termination of parental rights provision, HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
Corum'Rs ON UNiFORM STATE LAWS 217 (1953). The Uniform Adoption Act leaves
what is meant by judicial termination of parental rights to be decided by the various
state courts, each applying its own law. The act itself neither defines judicial termina-
tion nor does it specify procedure for procuring termination. While some may feel this
approach is wise, it seems that the Uniform Act has not established any standards or
guides other than pointing out the need for such a statute, and consequently the force
of the Uniform Adoption Act is insignificant.
89. Simpson, supra note 61, at 367. The parents' rights referred to include the
right to regain custody, to have reasonable visitation, to determine religious affiliation,
and to consent to an adoption. It is interesting to note that in Wisconsin and Delaware,
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is there a complete and irrevocable divestment of all legal rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations of the parent and child with respect to each other;
and so only with judicial termination is the child's status as legally free for
adoption made certain.9"
An advantage over the dependent child proceeding is that it is clear
from the start that the purpose of the termination procedure is to irrevoc-
ably sever the rights of the parents in the child and to place him for
adoption. There are many possible dispositions under the dependency
and neglect statutes, and courts commonly permit a child to be returned
to his parents even after "permanent" termination on a showing of
changed conditions.
Indiana presently provides for the issue of abandonment to be
litigated in the adoption proceedings.9' However, if the parties and pro-
ceedings in abandonment were kept separate, termination of parental
rights would not be mixed with problems of placing the child with adopt-
ing parents.92 With separation, judicial evaluation of new and old parents
will no longer be biased by comparing them. Moreover, separation of the
parties insures the secrecy necessary to prevent anxiety and possible strife.
The use of a procedure for the prior termination of parental rights be-
comes very important in these abandonment cases. If the parent is going
to object, he must do so at the hearing rather than show up during the
waiting period prior to adoption and announce himself ready to take over
the care of the child again.9" Consequently, one of the primary purposes
of judicial termination of parental rights legislation is to enable agencies,
with a clear conscience, to place children where formerly they hesitated to
do so for fear the natural parents would withhold consent and prevail
against the adoption and there was no other way to test the case except
by adoption.9"
Following the termination of parental rights the court may transfer
states which have a similar provision for prior termination of parental rights, there has
been no record of adoption petitions contested on the grounds of improper consent.
Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1954).
90. Prior termination of parental rights is sound public policy. "That policy is
designed to prevent harassment and possible extortion that might result if possibly
unscrupulous natural parents, guilty of neglecting their child, gained knowledge of its
whereabouts and that of its adoptive parents. That policy directed against requiring
consent and notice, also is designed to allay the fears of prospective adoptive parents,
and to encourage willing persons to give underprivileged children an opportunity in life,
through adoption, that they otherwise would be denied-without a constant fear that the
affection that almost invariably comes with the adoption will be fractured." Jacob v.
State, 7 Utah 2d 304, 306, 323 P.2d 720, 721-22 (1958).
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946). See text accompanying note 76 supra.
92. Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1240, 1248 (1951).
93. Simpson, supra note 61, at 372.
94. Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1240 (1951).
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the "care, control and custody" of the child to an authorized agency,
which then has authority to consent to the child's adoption.9"
The purpose of termination legislation is to provide for voluntary96
and involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship and for sub-
stitution of parental care and supervision by a judicial process which
will safeguard the rights and interests of all parties concerned and promote
their welfare and that of the state. Implicit in a modem termination
statute would be the philosophy that wherever possible family life should
be strengthened and preserved and that the act of severing the parent-
child relationship is of such vital importance as to require a judicial
determination.9
Termination of parental rights, which judicially orphans a child,
should be contemplated only with the view of creating new and permanent
rights through adoption." In the case of a non-adoptable child, such as
one with a serious defect or deformity, no useful purpose would be
served by invoking the termination statute, since custody or guardianship
proceedings would adequately protect the child while preserving what-
ever potential benefits, such as inheritance, might result in the future
from the continued natural relationship.99
The termination statute would work on inheritance rights in the
same manner that termination by adoption has in the past.' The
Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare apparently takes the view that the statute should operate
to terminate the rights of the child to inherit from the natural parents.''
This seems to be the most reasonable view, for if the statute operates to
irrevocably sever the parental rights over the child, there logically should
be left no semblance of rights in the child in relation to the parent either
95. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 322.04(2), 48.40-47 (1955); Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
715 (1950).
96. Termination legislation should include provision for voluntary termination at
the request of parents who want the parent-child relationship ended. It also appears
that the majority of termination cases would be voluntary, and a great proportion of
these would involve unmarried mothers. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Enuc. & WELFARE, op.
cit. supra, note 88.
97. Ibid.
98. Note, 13 Wyo. L.J. 185, 189 (1958). It appears that the County Department
of Public Welfare would work in conjunction with other public and private agencies to
arrange a suitable home for the child.
99. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, op. cit. supra, note 88.
100. The decree of the court in an adoption proceeding establishes the heirship of
the adopted child, and the adopted child is entitled to inherit on the same basis as a
natural child. Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993 (1896) ; Jones v. Leeds,
41 Ind. App. 164, 83 N.E. 526 (1908).
101. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. No.
346, Standards For Specialized Courts Dealing with Children 80 (1954).
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presently or in the future."2
Of the termination statutes now in existence the Children's Code of
Wisconsin0 3 seems to be the most progressive and the most far-reaching,
and it has often been proposed as a guide for the drafting of similar
legislation in other states. By the Wisconsin act the right to petition for
the termination of parental rights is not limited to authorized agencies,
but anyone may bring the action." 4 Either an agency or an individual
having actual custody of the child should be able to petition to terminate
the natural parents' rights. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare.. follows closely this same provision on who may petition. It
is recommended by the Department that those permitted to file a petition
for involuntary termination should include (a) either parent where termi-
nation is sought with respect to the other parent, (b) the guardian of the
child's person or his legal custodian or the person standing in loco parentis
to the child, (c) an authorized agency, and (d) any other person having a
legitimate interest in the matter. It is submitted that this broad authoriza-
tion of several parties to file a petition is wise, for such a provision more
nearly assures that if a child is being neglected or deprived his case will
be heard.
The grounds for termination under the Wisconsin statutes are not
confined to abandonment but also include lack of care and protection,
absence of support, habitual use of drugs and liquor, and mental de-
ficiency.' The progressive nature of the Wisconsin statute is exemplified
102. It may be argued that there is strong reason for not terminating the inherit-
ance rights of the child by such a termination statute, for this may leave the child
without the right of parental inheritance if he is not subsequently adopted. If the
natural parents wished to disinherit they could do so by will.
103. WIs. STAT. §§ 48.01- .997 (1955). The Children's Code was the result of one
and a half years of work by a committee of the Legislative Council and replaced the
then existing law. Wis. Sen. 1. 1731 (1955). Many of the substantive changes made
were of a minor nature; the major changes affected juvenile court jurisdiction, under
which the provisions for termination of parental rights fall.
104. Wis. STAT. § 48A0 (1955).
105. U.S. DE'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & VELFARE, op. cit. supra note 88.
106. Wis. STAT. § 48.40 (1955):
The court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of parents to a minor in
either of the following cases:
1) With the written consent of the parents to the termination of their
parental rights; or
2) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
a) That the parents have abandoned the minor; or
b) That the parents have substantially and continuously or
repeatedly refused to give the minor necessary parental
care and protection; or
c) That, although the parents are financially able, they have
substantially and continuously neglected to provide the
minor with necessary subsistence, education or other care
necessary for his health, morals, or well being or have
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in its recognition of the habitual use of drugs or liquor and mental de-
ficiency as grounds for termination. The present Adoption Act in Indiana
does not recognize the use of drugs or liquor as grounds for dispensing
with consent, nor does the Juvenile Court Act specifically mention them,
although they might be covered under the section which defines a
"neglected child" in part as one who "has not proper parental care or
guardianship."' 7 The need for the inclusion of such a provision in a
termination statute is obvious if the act is to have the broad coverage
which it needs to assure the result intended by it-more protection for the
child's welfare.
Under the old law in Wisconsin as interpreted by the attorney general
the rights of a mentally deficient parent could not be terminated on
grounds of abandonment or neglect but only by waiting two years and
having a re-examination of the parent for mental deficiency."0 8 This
created cases of very real hardship for children whose mentally deficient
parents disappeared before the two year period had passed; the parent's
rights could not be terminated and the child could not be placed in a
permanent home.
After study of the problem, the child welfare committee concluded
that the important question in determining whether the parent's rights
should be terminated is not the parent's mental deficiency since some
mentally deficient persons are adequate parents. The question is whether
the mental deficiency makes the parent incapable of giving the child proper
parental care and protection. Therefore the new law gives the juvenile
court the power to terminate rights of a parent found mentally deficient
under chapter fifty-one, if it finds that because of his mental deficiency
the parent is and will continue to be incapable of giving his child proper
neglected to pay for such subsistence, education or other
care when legal custody is lodged with others; or
d) That the parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, habit-
ual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or repeated
lewd and lascivious behavior or conviction and confinement
for a felony (including hospitalization within the sex
deviate statutes), which conduct or status if found by the
court to be likely to be detrimental to the health, morals
or best interests of the minor; or
e) That the parents have been found mentally deficient under
ch. 51 and the juvenile court finds that because of this
mental deficiency the parents are, and will continue to be
incapable of giving the minor proper parental care and
protection.
3) The parental rights of parents who have been found mentally ill
under ch. 51 may be terminated if grounds for termination under
sub. 2(a) to (d) existed prior to the time of finding the mental
illness.
107. Im. ANt. STAT. § 9-3206 (Burns 1956).
103. Wis. Laws, 1915, ch. 247 § 15; 41 Ops. Aw'Y GENr. 362 (1952).
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parental care and protection." 9
For a number of years there has been concern over the problems
resulting when parents of young children become mentally ill. Some-
times this mental illness is of a long duration, and when the parent
recovers he is a complete stranger to the child. Sometimes the parent never
recovers and as a result, the child may live in a foster home during all of
his childhood. This type of situation is particularly bad in the case of an
illegitimate child whose mother is mentally ill, for such a child has no
other parent to look after him. On the other hand, it is pointed out that
mental illness is not the fault of the parent any more than physical illness
is. No one would suggest terminating the rights of a parent who has
contracted tuberculosis. Furthermore, great progress has been made by
medical science in the treatment and cure of mental disease; cases con-
sidered hopeless and incurable today may not be so in the near future.
Therefore, the Wisconsin statute makes no change in the state's old law,
which did not recognize mental illness to be a ground for terminating
parental rights. However, in those cases where prior to the mental illness
the parent had abandoned or neglected his child so that grounds for termi-
nating his rights exist in that area, the court is allowed to terminate the
parent's rights even though the parent is incompetent because of the
adjudication of mental illness.' It appears that Indiana has no specific
provision relating to either mental deficiency or mental illness in either
its Adoption Act or its Juvenile Court Act, and it seems that such pro-
visions, operating as they do in the Wisconsin act, would be wise in-
clusions in a termination of parental rights act.
The Indiana Adoption Act requires a minimum six-month period of
abandonment 11 whereas the Wisconsin act in a somewhat novel approach
has placed no time limit on abandonment."' It appears that the omission
of a time limit, after which the act of abandonment is said to have com-
menced, would prevent unscrupulous parents from hedging just under
the time limit. This omission of a time limit for abandonment in a
termination of parental rights act would be for the best interest of the
child. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare appears to
have the most favorable approach in this area when it states, "[I]n
connection with termination the criterion should be lack of parental
efforts to maintain the parent-child relationship rather than a specific
time period of no contact between parent and child. Here the emphasis
would be on the parent's intention to forsake the parent-child relation-
109. Wis. STAT. § 48.40(2) 67 (1955).
110. Wis. STAT. § 48.40(3) (1955).
111. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Burns 1946).
112. Wis. STAT. § 48A0(2) (a) (1955).
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ship."' 3 The Wisconsin act provides that after the hearing has been
held, if the court finds that any of the conditions outlined in the statute
exist, it may terminate the parents' rights."4
IV. Co ciusIoN
In the past the courts have often justified their very strict require-
ments for a finding of abandonment on the ground that, although there
was no abandonment and no adoption order could be made without the
consent of the parents, custody of the child nevertheless might be given to
foster parents. It has been quite conscionable for the courts in the past
to allow the child to remain with the foster parents while at the same time
the natural parents' rights were not completely terminated. This practice
has given effect to the long-honored tradition that the protection of the
rights of natural parents is to be carried to a further degree in adoption
proceedings than in custody cases."' However, under a termination
statute, reluctance in finding an abandonment will have much graver
consequences than merely allowing the child to remain with his foster
parents. If the child in the termination proceeding is found not to be
abandoned he will be denied the possibility of being placed in an adoptive
home and of becoming part of a family; for many years he will be
transferred from home to home, never having the benefits of a family
life. Because of these consequences of a failure to find abandonment, it
seems that one by-product of such legislation would be a more liberal
definition of abandonment;..6 and the logical result will be that more
children will ultimately be freed for adoption. Such a statute seems to be
the only sound way in which to balance more evenly the right of the child
in adoption proceedings while protecting the rights of all those involved
and making for a more efficient and workable proceeding.
Although our social system has long recognized it, the law is slowly
moving to guarantee a right to an education for any child; perhaps the
time is also coming when it will be recognized that a child has a moral and
legal right to a parent who will support him and provide him with the
love and affection that a settled home life brings.
113. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 88.
114. Wis. STAT. § 48.43 (1955). The remaining provisions of the Wisconsin
statute are clear and not in need of further discussion, and since they do not conflict
with present dependency statutes in Indiana or the non-consensual provisions of the
Indiana Adoption Act, they could be included in a termination of parental rights act
adopted in Indiana.
115. In re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 189 N.E.2d 593 (1963).
116. Note, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 579, 592 (1957).
